ABSTRACT This paper is a compilation and expansion of two earlier papers, one on systemic risk and the other on strategic risk management. Part 1 of the paper proposes a definition and assessment methodology for systemic financial risk that was inspired by systems accident research. Sociologist Charles Perrow found that industrial, aviation and marine systems are prone to failure if those systems are interactively complex and tightly coupled. Using that framework as a starting point, financial crisis research led to the definition of systemic financial risk as a function of financial complexity and excessive leverage. The paper presents practical criteria for applying these parameters, and then profiles the triggering mechanism of systemic financial risk-financial contagion-in a behavioral context consistent with my framework. Part 2 of the paper presents an approach for identifying the weak signals of developing ambiguous threats, such as systemic financial risk manifestation, as well as an approach for economically managing the risk of enterprise-threatening loss. Both parts of the paper are readily assessable to a broad array of financial agents and researchers. 
Introduction: Systemic Risk
The popular definition of systemic financial risk is "risk that cannot be diversified" (Brealey and Meyers, 2000 [1981] , p. 1,068). Notwithstanding its popularity, this definition has littleif any-practical value, especially since the phenomenon of systemic financial risk has become much more tangible following the 1997-1998 and 2007-2008 financial crises. In fact, since 2008, a question that is frequently asked is "Can the global financial system come tumbling down?" Interestingly, such a question was addressed some time ago by the late George Goodman a/k/a "Adam Smith" in his classic book, The Money Game, as follows: "Can it all come tumbling down? In a paper market, based on belief, this fear is universal, no matter how deep it is buried.
Sure, it can all come tumbling down. All it takes if for belief to go away" (Goodman, 1968 (Goodman, [1967 , p. 288).
I agree with Mr. Goodman, which begs the question: how can one tell if the "risk of non-belief" is increasing and, potentially, if the risk of another financial crisis is manifesting? To answer this question I looked to systems-oriented research, which led me to define systemic financial risk as the possibility of an economy-wide crash caused by losses generated from complex financial interactions fueled by excessive leverage. This definition was inspired by Perrow (1999 [1984] ) and his seminal systems accident framework, which defines an accident-prone system as one that is both interactively complex and tightly coupled. This framework was derived from detailed analyses of industrial, aviation and marine accidents by way of case studies. Leveraging this approach, I analyzed financial crisis case histories to derive a framework to assess systemic financial risk, 1 which is presented in the first two sections below.
The triggering mechanism of systemic financial risk-financial contagion-is then profiled from a behavioral perspective, and the framework is then applied to an overview of the modern financial system leading to a discussion of practical risk management techniques.
Financial Complexity
The first parameter of systemic financial risk is financial complexity. 2 In general, a system is complex "when there are strong interactions among its elements, so that current events heavily influence the probabilities of many kinds of later events" (Axelrod and Cohen, 2000, p. 7) .
Extending this basic definition, financial complexity can be practically defined as unfamiliar, unexpected, and/or not immediately comprehensible financial interactions that could be systemically significant. 3 According to Professors Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Even when the likelihood of failure in each component [of a system] is slight, the probability of an overall failure can be high if many components are involved." 4 As defined here, financial complexity is a function of the components or criteria outlined in Table 1 . Table 1 Common What makes this exhibit material from a systemic risk perspective is not just its "big numbers" but also the interconnected counterparty structure that was (is) exposed to it. Significantly, this structure is the result of both governmental and non-governmental financial actions because government has facilitated the sale of troubled financial institutions to more fiscally sound ones. The short-term objective of this policy, and its related easy-money policies (which are discussed below), was to rescue troubled institutions without directly involving taxpayer funds, which seems to have been accomplished. However, one long-term consequence of the policy has been steadily increased levels of financial concentrations risk. 7 The second criterion follows the first in that financial concentrations are subject to strict transactional requirements. The quintessential example of a strict financial transactional requirement is "on demand" deposit withdrawals in a fractional reserve banking system. Taken to extremes such withdrawals can result in a run, which could become systemically significant.
For example, during the Great Depression, "The number of commercial bank failures increased from 1,453 in 1932 to 4,000 in 1933 (most of which took place in the first quarter), with deposits of failed banks increasing from $706 million to $3.6 billion in the same period" (Rothbard, 2000 (Rothbard, [1963 , p. 325). Bank runs have since generally become a thing of the past due to the creation of deposit insurance. 8 However, run-like behavior still occurs; for example, consider the repo market during the 2007-2008 financial crisis (McLean and Nocera, 2010, p, 242) . Furthermore, the failure of AIG is attributed, at least in part, to a collateral run based on requirements outlined in credit support annexes to derivatives contracts the firm sold. 9 Significantly, those contracts were so complicated they were allegedly not well understood by AIG's executives prior to the financial crisis that caused it to fail (e.g., Boyd, 2011) . We return to the issue of limited understanding in complex finance shortly. The next criterion is that financial products and/or counterparties have the potential to interact. In his study of LTCM's 1998 failure, noted that the fund was trading in swaps and bonds in Great Britain, Denmark, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Korea, Poland, China, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Russia (p. 188). Clearly, their portfolio had significant potential to interact, 10 , 11 as did AIG's ten years later as Boyd (2011) observed:
"Given that almost a dozen insurance subs were compromised, millions of policyholders were in danger of literally being at risk with no economic backing to support their claims.
Internationally, there would be immediate slowdown to shipping and aviation, as AIG was a key player in insuring both market segments…. What cash or liquid assets there was at AIG would have been sent, eventually, to the insurance subsidiaries to meet those obligations. Left remaining would have been a $1.2 trillion balance sheet that would have dwarfed the collapse from the looming Lehman bankruptcy" (p. 281; italics added).
According to the same author, "the wide-ranging connections from AIG to the entire global financial apparatus wasn't either understood or appreciated" (Boyd, 2011, p. 280) . 12 Insightful work by Chan-Lau (2010) demonstrates the applicability of interconnectedness-based analysis;
however, from a financial system's perspective such analysis should be accompanied by an appreciation for interactions subject to unfamiliar or unexpected feedback loops such as, for instance, AIG's potential impact on shipping and aviation noted above. 13 For a more detailed example, consider financial market activity during the 1997-1998 financial contagion as described by : 

The intensity of the selling resulted in traders taking steps "to protect themselves against Long-Term's imminent collapse," which ultimately resulted in a drastic step: "traders went on strike and 'liquidity' disappeared" (p. 229).
14,15
As another example, ) stated that the "essential problem" during the financial crisis of 2007-2008, " was that the system was becoming trapped in a vicious spiral. The more banks revealed losses on super-senior assets-or any other credit assets-the more scared investors became, causing the prices of the assets to fall still further, which forced the banks to make more write-downs. It was a pernicious feedback loop" (p. 210). 16 , 17 Unfamiliar or unexpected financial interactions can also involve governmental financial agents.
For example, the structured finance products at the center of the 2007-2008 financial crisis were initially created to mitigate the effects of regulatory banking capital requirements , 18 as well as to take advantage of tax credits (Boyd, 2011, p. 80) . 19 These products therefore helped to facilitate compliance with the government's easylending mortgage policy that began in the early 1990s (Redleaf and Vigilante, 2010, Ch. 10) .
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An implicit "too-big-to-fail government guarantee" further facilitated compliance with that policy for "large complex financial institutions" (Acharya, et al., 2011, pp. 48-49) . 21 However, perhaps the most significant example of governmentally-triggered feedback over the past generation has resulted from its consistent easy-money policy during periods of financial volatility, which Morris (2008) The above is significant because the "free market" is frequently identified as the culprit of many financial crises, including the most recent one. 25 , 26 From a systemic perspective, this is not accurate because the United States' financial system is and has been a "mixed economy"
inasmuch as government actively participates in financial matters/transactions via regulation, 27 the related phenomenon of "regulatory capture" (Dunbar, 2011, Ch. 5 Each crisis brought to light staggering derivatives-based knowledge gaps that many blame, at least partially, on the quantitative models used to make derivatives-based decisions.
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However, from a system's perspective, such critiques should be broadened:
 From a methodological perspective it is, and has been, accepted practice to rely on modeled output derived from unrealistic assumptions so long as the output "yields sufficiently accurate predictions" (Friedman, 1966, pp. 3-16, 30-43) . 39 There are obvious issues with this approach; for example, how is "accurate" defined, and over what time frame: "normal" times or more volatile ones, and if the later, how is "volatile" defined, etc. From a financial perspective, such thinking over time facilitated the widespread belief in a body of theory developed off of a base of knowingly false assumptions, 40 , 41 which nevertheless significantly influenced financial agent-governmental and non-governmental-actions.

The increasingly intense focus on financial modeling led to a steady decline in other forms of analyses, at all levels. For example, during the 2007-2008 crisis, Tully (2008) profiled J.P. Morgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon's detail-focus and intimated that it, and the culture it produced, was one of the reasons why J.P. Morgan Chase weathered the crises relatively well.
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If his intimation is correct, it begs the question why other financial executives were not similarly focused given the complexity of their firms' risk profiles; and yet, according to Lewis (2010) , prior to the crisis some financial executives did not even "know their own balance sheets" (p. 174). One consequence of the above over the past generation was that many, but certainly not all, financial agents either missed signals of approaching financial volatility or followed conventional wisdom on efficient markets and the governmental intervention seemingly intended to facilitate efficiency (e.g., the Greenspan/Bernanke Put). 44 , 45 Another consequence was that as financial modeling came to be more relied upon, it became a specialized field even though quantitative models are relatively easy to copy. 46 Therefore, when model-based strategies started generating abnormal returns they attracted both investors and competitors which, along with the returns, caused portfolio sizes to increase. 47 This phenomenon limited investment alternatives thereby creating a temptation to normalize strategic deviations, or to incrementally expand an investment and/or business strategy over time resulting in the assumption of greater levels of risk than originally would have been tolerated. 48 As quantitatively-generated investment opportunities became increasingly limited due to increasing portfolio sizes and competition, many financial institutions began to incrementally expand their investment and/or business strategies in search of other opportunities. Over time, this expansion led to broader, more expansive risk profiles that were nevertheless viewed as "normal"-or consistent with a stated risk appetite-even though they were not. Because this expansion occurred incrementally it did not appear deviant; on the contrary, financial agents often believed their behavior conformed to their institutions' investment and/or strategic principles. One possible reason for this is that it is relatively easy to rationalize incremental deviations for yield, diversification or assumed informational advantage reasons that, when assessed in isolation, seem strategically consistent. 49 Consider the following examples:
 LTCM was formed to "trade spreads between pairs of bonds to either widen or contract" on a highly leveraged basis (Lowenstein, 2000, p. 26 ; italics original). However, "As the pressure to find suitable trades mounted, they increasingly strayed into more exotic tundra,…
[including] directional bets, abandoning (for a fraction of its portfolio [i.e., incrementally]) the cautious hedging strategy that had been its trademark" (Lowenstein, 2000, pp. 127-128) .
 AIG Financial Products (FP) normalized strategic deviations over time prior to its failure as Boyd (2007) Act, which gave these "GSEs a mandate to purchase lower-quality mortgages" (p. 32). This deviation was the first of many GSE strategic deviations that resulted in these entities being "grown far beyond their initial purpose into uncontrollable and systemically risky behemoths" (Acharya, et al., 2011, p. 6 ).50
The risks of normalizing strategic deviations can be difficult to identify, assess and quantify as emerging risks are developing; however, once such risks manifest the cumulative effects are often seen to have resulted in outsized losses being brought within the main body of a loss distribution. In other words, the process of normalizing strategic deviations can result in much higher frequencies of extreme events over time. Morgenson and Rosner (2011) recognized this in their study of Fannie Mae when they observed that "the company's past experience with losses was almost certainly not going to be repeated going forward, given the new low-income housing requirements mandated by Congress. Fannie was embracing a new world of riskier loans…" (p. 28).
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Excessive Leverage
As noted above, Perrow's (1999 Perrow's ( 1984 ) systems accident framework is based on two parameters: complexity and tight coupling, which is "a mechanical term meaning there is no slack or buffer or give between two items. What happens in one directly affects what happens in the other" (pp. [89] [90] . Perrow also applied his framework to financial risk and in so doing used volume as a financial proxy for tight coupling. However, increased volume adds depth and breadth to a market and thus is analogous to loose coupling, not tight. 52 According to Acharya, et al. (2011) , a more appropriate financial analog to tight coupling is excessive leverage because, "Systemic risk emerges when a financial sector at large does not have enough capital to cover either its debts or its bets. As a result, when those bets go sour and debts cannot be paid, many institutions fail or the credit markets freeze-and without credit, commerce plummets, and economies fall into recession" (pp. [63] [64] . 53 Furthermore, Richard Bookstaber observed that, "Tight coupling in accentuated by leverage, itself a direct result of liquidity.
Leverage and margin are simply loans that use securities as collateral, and the willingness to lend against this collateral is directly related to the lender's ability to quickly sell out of the securities if the margin is not posted. The more liquid the securities, the better the leverage terms will be. So tight coupling mean higher potential leverage." (Grant, 2008, p. 347) . For example, during the 2007-2008 financial crisis one observer described the market environment "as something akin to a horror movie, in which an insatiable monster marauds across Wall Street, attacking leverage wherever it could find it" (Farrell, 2010, p. 231 ). 54 From a financial agent perspective, excessive leverage has long equated to increased levels of risk and thus capital structure is not, and never has been, "irrelevant." Quite the contrary, in fact; for example, one author views capital structure as a "volatility machine" that should be actively managed (Pettis, 2001  "Fannie-Freddie fell off the cliff, both because of lower profitability (ROA) and higher leverage. Leverage and risks-essential features that had helped them accelerate and pump up greater shareholder returns (ROE) in good times-accelerated their decline when the housing markets hit the wall" (Acharya, et al., 2011, p. 55) .56
From a systemic financial risk perspective, excessive leverage can be defined as an economywide debt load that significantly reduces financial capacity thereby increasing the risk of failure due to manifesting financial complexity risk. Historical examples include:
 Banks over-leveraged from a fractional reserve perspective suffered significant distress during the Great Depression, as well as earlier financial crises.57
 Before its 1998 failure, LTCM's debt-to-equity ratio, excluding derivatives, swelled to "greater than 100-to-1" (Lowenstein, 2000, p. 191 (Boyd, 2011, p. 280.) ,59 but (3) "AIG's CDS positions were peanuts in comparison to the GSEs' writing $3.5 trillion worth of credit guarantees on much riskier assets-residential mortgages-and similarly with little capital [i.e., excessively leveraged] (albeit in accordance with regulatory requirements) and all in one direction" (Acharya, et al., 2011, p. 67.) . 60 , 61 In a "mixed" financial system (or a system that is neither 100% capitalistic nor 100% socialist), excessive leverage applies to governmental, as well as non-governmental, financial agents; therefore, the same kind of approach can be used to assess national debt. For example, the United States' debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) profile can be illustrated as shown in The merits of national debt in the United States have been debated since its founding, but even those strongly in favor of it agree there is a "tipping point" beyond which it should not go. For example, according to Wright (2008) , even Alexander "Hamilton conceded that there existed a tipping point beyond which additions to the national debt would be economically and politically deleterious. 'Where this critical point is cannot be pronounced; but it is impossible to believe,' he assured, 'that there is not such a point'" (pp.141-142). Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) suggest that a ratio of 90% gross public leverage-to-GDP (the bottom line in Figure 4) has proven to be an "important marker" of this tipping point over time (represented in the exhibit by a thick-horizontal line). Gross public leverage, however, is not a comprehensive measure: adding governmental debt to non-governmental debt and then comparing to GDP provides a more comprehensive view of national debt (the upper, diamond-line in Figure 4 ). However, not even this measure is comprehensive because it excludes unfunded liabilities, which are significant as Fisher (2008) 1945 1947 1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 Total Debt % GDP Gross Public Debt % GDP
The fact that "excessive leverage" appears so hard to measure underscores the need to systemically address it. 66 Excessive amounts of leverage result in limited-to-no capacity to respond to financial crises. According to , financial crises present a "timeless irony: when you need money most, the most likely sources of it are likely to be hurting as well" (p. 156). It is for this reason that Warburton (2005 Warburton ( [1999 ) stated in his incredibly prescient work that, "The best protection against adversity is to have minimal debt and ample liquidity" (p. 252). In essence, liquidity is slack (like loose coupling), which can be used to mitigate the effects of a financial crisis in systemically beneficial ways. 
Financial Contagion
Financial contagion can broadly be defined as the spillover of volatility from one financial counterparty, sector, region, and/or product to another, and is the manifestation trigger of systemic financial risk. 67 The specific cause(s) of financial contagion can vary from case-tocase, but irrespective of the cause(s) its severity is a function of volatility that traverses the Market behavior like this has been described as "animal spirits… [or] a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction" (Keynes, 1964 (Keynes, [1953 , p. 161). 68 For example, consider LTCM's aforementioned thoughts as it was experiencing the unfamiliar/unexpected feedback loops that contributed to its failure: the market behavior "was simply nonsensical." Such statements pejoratively dismiss a central facet of contagious financial behavior; namely, that during periods of systemic volatility, financial agents can be expected to act aggressively to protect their capital. As Goodhart (1969) observed, "Fear seems to be a remarkably contagious emotion" (p. 131). 69 Acharya, et al. (2011) The same kind of behavior was experienced in 1997-1998 as MacKenzie (2006) observed:
"The configuration of the markets by August 1998,… was that the widening of spreads was self-feeding rather than self-limiting. As arbitrageurs began to incur losses, they almost all seem to have reacted by seeking to reduce their positions and in so doing they intensified the price pressure that that had caused them to make the reductions" (p. 231).
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The above is not meant to imply that all actions undertaken by financial agents, either during a financial contagion or in less volatile times, are rational; only that many of them are when considered in context. 73 Research designed to gain a greater systemic understanding of financial behavior could help facilitate efforts to mitigate certain forms of market risk over time. For example, according to Kahneman (2011) : "One of the lessons of the financial crisis that led to the Great Recession is that there are periods in which competition, among experts and among organizations, creates powerful forces that favor collective blindness to risk and uncertainty" (p. 262). A greater understanding of these forces-including, for example, the effects of anchoring-coupled with other forms of analyses-qualitative and quantitativecould facilitate efforts to mitigate contagious effects.
Post Crisis
Following the 2007-2008 financial crisis, government officials in many countries sought to enact new regulations to prevent another crisis, and they made public statements to that effect. (Kaufman, 1986, pp. 34-35) . This behavior did not change following the S&L crisis, of course, as monetary policy became increasingly easier thereby reducing the rates of interest offered on insured savings accounts to increasingly low levels thereby adversely impacting low, middle and upper-middle income families which, of course, is most of the U.S. As a result, a shadow banking system has arisen via money market funds, etc., which operate with implicit government guarantees to (somewhat) higher yielding instruments. The relationship between established banks and shadow banks is at best murky, and as such if the 1930s convention of deposit insurance is going to be continued-and politically I do not see how it will not be-consideration should be given to allow people to choose how they would like their savings insured. 76 For example:
 Depositors who want 100% "on demand" savings could pay a warehouse fee for those savings, which is akin to the fee for a "safe deposit box."
 Next, different rates of interest could be offered based on different levels of insured deposits. In effect, depositors could insure their savings based on their forecasted cash needs; near-term needs will likely fall in the 100% insured category while later-term needs would be proportionally insured.
 To facilitate deposit insurance selection across a portfolio of savings, banks could provide financial advice. Of course, they would be liable if advice proves either foolish or fraudulent.
In this environment, there would be no implicit guarantees so everyone (individual savers, their advisers and their banks) would be at-risk of loss, and therefore a premium would once again be applied to sound risk management practices.
Proposal like the above would eliminate much of the "shadow" that currently exists in banking.
And with money to be made in core banking again, many banks would no doubt concentrate on banking-and managing their balance sheets-to earn their return, which is what many say they want them to do.
While analyses such as the above are proceeding, the debt burden could be aggressively reduced and restructured to more closely correlate with revenue patterns in order to mitigate the effects of the next crisis-and there is always a next crisis. 77 The importance of reducing "From Main Street to Wall Street, one common thread runs through all facets of this story:
leverage. Homeowners and major financial firms alike had taken on too much risk and too much debt in their quest for gains. Whenever leverage is excessive, or too many assets are supported with too little owner-contributed capital, a decline in value of the assets can leave the owner of those assets without the capital to cover losses. In short, an excessively leveraged nation is nothing more than a bubble nation" (p. 5).
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Eliminating excessive leverage will increase financial capacity (or slack), which is important because, according to Wright (2008) , "Even if current projections hold true, a crisis looms.
When it will occur and how it will manifest remain unclear but something is going to have to give at some point" (p. 281). The Economist (2011) which has grown incredibly large under Presidents Bush (43) and Obama.
Perrow observed that interactively complex and tightly coupled systems will eventually fail because failure is the logical consequence of such systems. Given the high degree of complexity and leverage in the financial system right now it too could fail, unless the risks of failure are mitigated via significant de-leveraging in the short-term and the rational reduction of financial complexity over time.
In closing this section of the paper, I note that while commenting on Perrow's work, Lo (1997) stated that, "The challenge is to quantify the notions of interactive complexity and tight coupling so that intelligent trade-offs between risk and reward can be properly made, in both financial and non-financial contexts" (p. 22). Such statements under-score a problem popularized by Taleb (2007 Taleb ( ) and (2005 Taleb ( [2004 ); namely, that as human beings we do not, and likely never will, possess the knowledge necessary to quantify social systems like we do for certain natural systems. 82 , 83 This is not to say that quantitative analysis has no place in systemic financial risk analysis; for example, certain research streams seem to hold significant promise. 84 However, to be effective, quantitative analysis should be used in conjunction with other forms of qualitative and behavioral analyses. Given the experiences of the last generation research integrating these analyses into systemic findings and guidance is clearly called for. 85 But what can be done to manage risk in the interim? There are many misconceptions of risk management in general, and hedging in particular.
Risk Management
Because risk, like value, is subjective (Homer and Sylla, 2005 [1963] , p. 416) there is no one way to manage it; however, there are sound principles that can and should be applied to risk management, similar to more mature disciplines like financial analysis and performance management. Such principles could be applied to the three basic ways that risk can be managed:
by mitigating it, diversifying away from it or transferring it. Examples of risk transfer include the procurement of insurance as well as hedging.
While economical investment can practically inform each of the three above risk management activities, this section of the paper focuses on its application to hedging. Before a hedge can be considered, a balance sheet must be intensely scrutinized for significant exposure concentrations. To understand why, recall the quote cited above on exposure concentrations:
"If you have got sixty, one hundred billion, or however many billions of something on your balance sheet, that is a very big number… I don't think you should ignore a big number, no matter what it is" , p. 64; italics original). I do not think big numbers should be ignored either. To be effective, such analyses should be conducted on both a gross and net basis, not just net. As Rickards (2011) explained, "Fundamentally, the risk is in the gross position, not the net. When gross positions increase by 500 percent, the theoretical risk increases by 5,000 percent or more because of the exponential relationship between scale and catastrophic event size" (p. 210). In other words, during an extreme event a recovery could be less than 100 cents on the dollar thereby exacerbating a concentrated loss.
Once material exposure concentrations have been identified, analysis could be undertaken to identify potential threats that could trigger a concentrated loss. Significantly, many times such threats will be "ambiguous." According to Roberto, et al. (2006) ambiguous threats are potential losses that seem highly uncertain due to an unexpected (and frequently non-linear) fact pattern that does not lead to obvious conclusions. Threats that could trigger a concentrated loss-ambiguous and non-ambiguous alike-should be carefully tracked and if, over time, a particular threat appears to be developing then risk management alternatives should be considered.
The concept of threat development is important because, contrary to popular opinion, most threats do not just occur; they develop over time. One recent example is the 2007-2008 financial crisis, which developed over the span of a decade as illustrated in Figure 5 . During the threat development horizon, a number of practical risk management options were available to exposed parties, including hedging with credit default swaps (CDS). As an example, Grant (2008) To see how economical this investment was, consider the following: One way commercial insurance companies evaluate risk pricing is to divide the premium of risk transfer (in this case, $14.25 million) by the amount of risk being transferred (in this case, $750 million), which here gives a "rate on line" of $0.014. By comparison, it is not uncommon for many businesses to pay $40,000 or more per year for $1 million of general liability insurance, which equates to a "rate on line" of $0.04. 89 Lewis (2010) 
2002:
Warren Buffett refers to derivatives as "financial weapons of mass destruction," using the LTCM case to support his comments. hadn't participated in the market's champagne swilling, he was determined to avoid the brutal hangover. In addition to moving his investments to higher ground, he used credit default swaps to wager that the U.S. credit market would go belly up. His bet: $341 million. His take-home when the house of cards came tumbling down: more than $2 billion."
To illustrate how this hedge performed during the financial crisis, consider the chart presented in Figure 6 . Fairfax's performance is presented in the left-most bar, which is significantly greater than the other five insurers that posted a profit during this time period, in contrast to all of the others that lost money. Despite the inherent logic of an economical hedging approach, and the well-publicized performance of firms like Fairfax that employ it, many firms not only do not take advantage of economical hedge pricing but they also start to hedge after prices have spiked due to widening spreads or expanding volatility.
From a risk management perspective, with emphasis on "management," hedging should be conducted before-not after-spreads widen or volatility expands because that is when it is most economical to do so. While this may be difficult for firms that manage to the expectations of financial analysts, longer term investors will likely positively view missing a short-term earnings' expectation by pennies (or even more) per share if the shortcoming results from economical risk management activities that are designed to not only mitigate the risk of becoming a forced seller during market distress, but will also position a firm to take advantage of the distressed selling of others. Such an approach should seemingly be at the forefront of corporate and professional investment risk management functions, especially strategic risk management functions, but that does not seem to be the case (e.g., Damodaran, 2008 and Crouhy, et al., 2006) . Hopefully, this paper will help to redirect the focus, however marginally, toward such an approach from both a research and practical perspective. observed, "Error and confusion on the real facts of past crises is common and leads to false expectations of future events" (Homer and Johannesen, 1969, p. 3) . I have tried to avoid this error in drafting this paper.
2 "My thesis is that financial complexity poses a clear and present danger" (Grant, 2008, p. 345) .
3 Inspired by Perrow (1999 [1984 ), p. 78. 4 As quoted in Kahneman (2011) , p. 428. The authors continue, "Because of anchoring, people will tend to underestimate the probabilities of failure in complex systems."
5 Quoted by ), p. 64.
6 For details on the savings and loan crisis see, for example, Day (1993) and Mayer (1990) . 7 According to : "A disturbing side effect of the government effort to merge big banks was that banking power was becoming consolidated among fewer firms: big, protected institutions were swallowing everyone else" (p. 247).
8 A recent bank run occurred in 2007 at the United Kingdom's Northern Rock . Other examples of modern day runs can be found in the failure of Bear Sterns (Rickards, 2011, p. 197) and WaMu, which at the time was the United States' largest savings and loan (Grind, 2012, p. 1) .
9 For more information see Boyd (2011), and Mclean and Nocera (2010), pp. 190-191 . AIG's securities lending program also contributed to its historic failure (Mclean and Nocera, 2010, p. 328 and Sorkin, 2009, p. 327 . 11 As Grant (2014b) insightfully observed, "Debts and derivatives bond nations together as religion or jazz have never done" (p. 1). 12 See also Sorkin (2009), p. 208 . For other examples see Grind (2012), p. 168, and Bagus and Howden (2011) who note the general lack of understanding of, or appreciation for, the interconnectivity of the global financial system during Iceland's failure (p. 40).
13 McLean and Nocera (2010) Goodhart (1969) observed that "the whole system of interconnecting links between financial centers, whereby capital movements were triggered in response to the emergence of sufficient interest differentials, appears at first sight to be a beautiful and smoothly working thermostatic device which would ensure that no monetary crisis should develop. Yet, the monetary system was not immune…" (pp. 107-108 and 17, 88 and 125) . Note also Hammond (1957) , pp. 558-559. 18 The title of the second chapter of this work is "Dancing Around the Regulators." Note also Boyd (2011 ), pp. 89, 112, Acharya, et al. (2011 ), p. 25, McLean and Nocera (2010 ), p. 189, and Sorkin (2009 Note that Fannie Mae "helped pioneer the first deals that used the low-income housing tax credit program to create affordable housing" (McLean and Nocera, 2010, p. 11) . "Tax arbitrage" in general has a long history (e.g., Wright, 2008, p. 29) . Tax considerations have played a significant role in modern finance from the LBO movement of the 1980s (e.g., Lewis, [1991 , pp. [69] [70] 106 ) to the bailouts generated from the 2007-2008 financial crisis (e.g., Sorkin, 2009, p. 502 and Barth, 2009, p. 268 Bagus and Howden (2011) discuss the role of the implicit too-big-to-fail guarantee in Iceland's failure (pp. 38-41).
22 "The Fed's one-sentence statement read: 'The Federal Reserve, consistent with its responsibilities as the nation's Central Bank, affirmed today it readiness to serve as a source of liquidity to support the economic and financial system'" (Destler and Henning, 1989, p. 66, FN. 40) . 23 According to this same source, the "influential investment newsletter" was, 27 "The early years of the republic are often spoken of as if the era were one of laisse faire in which government authority refrained from interference in business and benevolently left it a free field.
Nothing of the sort was true of banking" (Hammond, 1957, p. 185 -to-2008 (pp. 322-337) . In short, prior to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 the federal government regulated the banking industry and thus it was it was not "free."
Furthermore, there are some who feel that these regulations either caused or contributed to the famous 1907 financial crisis. For more information see Goodhart (1969) , Ch. 4. 28 As observed by Doyle (2014) : "With the passage of time, the benefit of hindsight, and the preponderance of the evidence, American taxpayers can finally conclude that a regulatory cover of absolute immunity combined with little meaningful transparency added up to a license to steal-for Wall Street and Washington alike" (p. 87). For more information on questionable Washington behavior see, for example, Schweizer (2011) . It is important to understand that this type of behavior is also not a new phenomenon; for example, there has been close interactions between government officials and banks ever since this country's founding as, for example, Hammond (1957) Greider, 1987, p. 438) . 29 The cries for "more government" that typically follow a crisis often ignore this phenomenon thereby assuming that "government" is not prone to normal social behaviors. This position is also reflected in many economic studies and books, which tend to focus on select (i.e., isolated) data and actions thereby assuming away personal and social motives and relationships. There are exceptions, of course.
Consider, for example, Rothbard (2005 Rothbard ( [2002 ), which includes social actors in its analysis, which is a theme employed by Prins (2014) . 30 Fiscal policy can affect a financial system in a number of ways; for example, wartime activity has historically resulted in significant levels of government spending and debt (e.g., Wright, 2008) . See also Hunt (2009 ), pp. 59-65 and Kindleberger and Aliber (2011 [1978 ), p. 49.
31 Consider the different tax treatments for dividends and capital gains, as well as the different tax treatments for health insurance provided by employers and health insurance purchased individually. On the influence of taxes to retirement benefits in general see, for example, Schultz (2011), pp. 16, 23, 25, 61, 96, 100-103, 113-114, 117-118, 122-125, 127, 131, 134-135, 139-140, 142, 197-202, 205-207, 209, and 213 . 32 According to Woods (2009), "easy-money policy lures increasingly reckless or ill-prepared investors into the game, and misleads people into thinking a particular investment strategy is a no-lose proposition. Cheap money draws people into speculation who do not belong there, who know little about the market involved, and who see in it an irresistible get-rich-quick scheme" (p. 27). Theory suggesting that easy-money causes business cycles is contentious in some circles; however, it seems to be growing in acceptance. For example, Harris (2008) stated that "for the last two years of Greenspan's chairmanship, the funds rate was too low relative to trends in the economy" (p. 155). Note also Kindleberger and Aliber (2011 [1978] ), p. 13 and Barth (2009), pp. 29-36, 244 . 33 See for example Acharya, et al. (2011) , Morgenson and Rosner (2011), and Sowell (2009), pp. 48-56 . On Iceland's GSEs see Bagus and Howden (2011), pp. 56-62. 34 As Mahar (2003) observed, "Like society itself, the… market depended on a web of relationships, and that web stretched all the way to Washington" (p. 235).
35 Note also Whitman and Diz (2009): "Adam Smith described the 'invisible hand' of the marketplace that will direct the allocation of resources to their most efficient use without government interference.
This type of invisible hand does not exist in the United States. Instead, government will always have a huge role to play in how resources are allocated by the private sector" (p. xxi).
36 Given all of the above, what is the reason for the constant drum-beat of blame against the "free market" after every market crisis? I do not know, but Duffy (2013) Time magazine puff piece revealed a mindset that would dominate the economy and markets ever since:
The financial elites would run things. Their primary tools would be monetary stimulus and systemic safety nets. If all went according to plan they would take credit; if not, they would blame capitalism.
Either way, their power would expand. And if they failed to see around corners, they would claim no one could" (p. 16). 37 The limits of economic and financial knowledge have long been known to certain economists such as Hayek (1945) and Sowell (1996 Sowell ( [1980 ). Unfortunately, they are very much in the minority, especially today. 38 See, for example, Salmon (2009) . In addition to models, many have blamed rating agencies; however, as McLean and Nocera (2010) observed, credit rating agency involvement in mortgage backed securities was necessary for the market to mature because "investors were never going to be comfortable with-or, to be blunt, willing to work hard enough to understand-the intricacies of the hundreds or thousands of mortgages inside each security" (p. 8). Nevertheless, correctly noted that, "It should have been obvious to every investor in subprime MBS that ratings are no substitute for careful research or due diligence before purchases" (p. 159). On this theme, Richard (2010) quotes investor Bill
